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Explaining postwar employment and unemployment in New Zealand is problematic for neoclassical economic theory. 
Up until the late 1970s the economy was overlaid with controls and 'rigidities' of many sorts, interfering with the 
operation of 1ree' market forces. Yet it delivered virtually zero unemployment without being unusually prone to 
inflationary pressures. From the 1980s onwards, our economy has been subjected to a remarkable regime of policy 
'reform', involving the opening up of markets to overseas competition, the dismantling or emasculating of centralised 
and/or collectivist institutions, and the adoption of an extreme version of monetarist ideology. Yet throughout these 
years of actions aimed at fostering "free markets', the actual macroeconomic performance of the markets, measured by 
the mismatch between supply and demand in the labour market (unemployment) has persistently deteriorated, with 
unemploymenl rates rising from less than half of one percent as late as 1977 to above 10% in the early 1990s. That is, 
the more market-oriented we became, the worse the markets performed. How can this be? The research program on 
which the present paper is a progress report tests hypotheses that can explain how both Keynesian and monetarist 
orthodoxies miss important aspects of New Zealand reality, and develops a model based on empathy between supply 
and demand sides of the labour market that is consistent with non-inflationary over{u/1 employment. 
Explaining postwar employment and unemployment in 
New Zealand is problematic for neoclassical economic 
theory. The last four decades divide into two periods. In the 
first period, which ended some time in the late 1970s, the 
economy was overlaid with controls and 'rigidities' of 
many sms, interfering with the operation of ' free' market 
forces. Yet it delivered virtually zero unemployment with-
out being Wlusually prone to inflationary pressures, con-
trary to the doctrine of the Phillips Curve 'tradeoff' ( dis-
covered, ironically, by a New Zealander, though of course 
using data from another country - Britain). 
Then, in the second period, our economy has been sub-
jected to a remarkable regime of policy 'reform' , involv-
ing the opening up of markets to overseas competition, the 
dismantling or emasculating of centralised and/or 
collectivist institutions, and the adoption of an extreme 
version of monetarist ideology. Yet throughout these years 
of actions aimed at fostering 'free markets', the actual 
macroeconomic perfonnance of the markets, measured by 
the mismatch between supply and demand in the labour 
market (unemployment) has persistently deteriorat~ with 
unemployment rates rising from less than half of one 
percent as late as 1977 to above 10% in the early 1990s. 
That is, the more market-oriented we became, the worse 
the marlcets performed. How can this be? The research 
program on which the present paper is a progress report is 
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aimed at testing the following hypothesis: The interesting 
thing is not that unemployment is high now, but that it was 
so low then. Mass unemployment is to be expected and 
possibly welcomed in a 'market' economy (in a sense to be 
elucidated below). Conventional theory has no difficulty 
in rationalising this. What we do lack is a cohesive theory 
which can explain the non-inflationary full employment in 
the two decades up to the mid-1970s. 
The fowth section of the paper offers the framework of 
such a theory. Firs~ though, in the second section, I outline 
the two (Keynesian and monetarist) orthodoxies and then 
in the following section suggest that neither of these is 
adequate to explain the NZ experience. The fifth section 
brings the Employment Contracts Act into the story. The 
next section lists and exonerates some of the 'usual sus-
pects' that have been proposed as possible culprits for our 
deteriorating employment performance. The final section 
introduces the database and modelling strategy to be used 
to test the hypothesis, and reports on preliminary results. 
Two Orthodoxies on Employment and 
Unemployment 
In macroeconomic theory and practice, the first quarter 
century after the Second World War belonged to the 
Keynesians (Keynes himself having established 
macroeconomics as an independent field in the 1930s), 
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whereas the quarter century now ending has seen monetar-
ists ascendant 1 To put it at its simplest, Keynesians 
thought that demand made things happen; monetarists 
stressed the supply side. I think they are both at least 
partially wrong, but more on that below. 
The Keynesian model assumes that the level of total or 
aggregatedemanddetennineshowmuchissupplied(GDP, 
employment), and stresses the importance of autonomous 
determinants of demand. such as exports, investment, and 
government spending and taxes, all of which could there-
fore be used as policy ' levers' to keep aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply in balance. 
This was all very well while it worked. which it seemed to 
be doing (at least in the English-speaking countries -
Europe and Japan were less concerned about 
macroeconomics; more interested in economic growth) 
through the 1950s and early 1960s. But with the new 
phenomenon of persistent full-ish employment (or near-
zero unemployment) came another -persistent upward 
pressure on prices. Most New Zealanders have experi-
enced nothing but inflation - a positive trend in the price 
level - and so probably don't realise how odd it is, from a 
historical perspective. But prices used to rise in good years 
and fall in bad. No particular trend was discernible at the 
time, though with hindsight we can see in the data an 
apparent faint upward movement over the millenia. Peri-
ods of price rises were called 'reflations', and were greatly 
welcomed as being conducive to profitability, optimism 
and investment 2 
The relationship between inflation and unemployment 
was first analysed statistically by an expatriate New Zea-
lander, A.W. (Bill) Phillips, in a 1958 paper which became 
an instant classic. Phillips discovered a negative relation-
ship- the Phillips Curve, as it was quickly dubbed, though 
not by him, of course - between historical data on annual 
wage rate changes and annual average levels of unemploy-
ment in the UK. This caused great excitement because it 
seemed to offer a trade-off, and economists love tradeoffs, 
which are, indee<L the foundation of economics as the 
' science of choice' . Policymakers could choose, say, to 
accept a higher rate of unemployment in exchange for 
lower rate of inflation. 
In fact the relationship was not linear - consumer prices 
would be stable (inflation= zero) at around 2.5% unem-
ployment at lower unemployment rates inflation would 
start to increase quite sharply, whereas allowing unem-
ployment to rise appreciably above 2.5% would not bring 
much in the way of further declines in the price level 
(though who would want price declines, anyway?). 
However, the relationship appeared to be stable, in the 
sense that data for the 1948-57 period, during which wage 
changes were positive in every year, fitted very neatly the 
curve estimated with data from the years 1861 to 1913, 
ovec which half century there had been about as many 
years in which wages were stable or fell as years when they 
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increased. 
Now, accepting two and a half percent unemployment 
rates in exchange for zero inflation seems from today's 
perspective to be not a very painful trade-off to have to 
make, and this highlights the problem: the trade-off turned 
out to be not stable - it deteriorated - and Keynesianism 
became vulnerable to attack. If one examines the 
macroeconomic perfonnance of each of the three big 
'Keynesian' economies- the UK, the US, Canada -over 
the quarter century following the end of Phillips database 
(that is, from 1958 through 1982), one finds that, fcx all 
three countries, average inflation was higher in each five 
year period than the preceding period. Nor was this traded-
off against lower unemployment or higher growth: follow-
ing the boom mid-1960s period, unemployment rose and 
productivity growth fell in each succeeding five-year 
period. in each of these economies. 
So there seemed to be something funny afoot with 
Keynesian doctrine, and the right wing of the economics 
profession, which had been resentfully quiescent during 
the Keynesian heyday, were quick to sniff it out What 
became known as the monetarist challenge to Keynesian 
macroeconomics is usually dated from Milton Friedman' s 
presidential address to the American Economic Associa-
tion, published in 1968, bolstered soon afterwards by the 
book edited by Edmund Phelps on the ' New 
Microeconomics' of employment theory. 
The Keynesians were vulnerable to attack on theoretical 
grounds. Orthodox (neoclassical) American and British 
Ke)'Ilesians, led by Paul Samuelson, had never dared 
follow their master in suggesting that capitalism's propen-
sity to cycles and slumps was due to chronic market failure 
(basically, failure of supply and demand curves to inter-
sect, especially when risk and uncertainty were involved). 
Instead, they preserved the old neoclassical postulate of 
perfectly competitive markets, and explained the failure of 
demand and supply to equate in the labour marlcet by 
assuming that wages and prices were somehow 'sticky • or 
even 'rigid', so that they stubbornly stayed above their 
market-clearing levels. 
Sticky wages and prices served the purpose of the 
Keynesians well enough, in that it allowed them to justify 
the proposition that government spending, augmented by 
the famous 'multiplier', could be used to shift demand 
curves, to bring them into balance with supply without 
recourse to wage cuts. 
But this was too much for monetarists like Friedman, with 
their highly developed faith in the strength of equilibrating 
market forces. If wages were too high to give everyone 
who wanted to work a job, why didn•t the market reduce 
them, given that the currently unemployed had every 
incentive to offer to work at wages that would attract 
employers? Why were wages so 'sticky'? What was the 
rational(' choice theoretic', in the jargon) reason for failure 
to make the necessary adjustments? 
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Keynesians muttered about minimum wage laws and trade 
unions (the latter particularly in Britain; less so in the much 
less heavily unionised US), but, given that they had never 
cast out the old perfect competition dogma, their excuses 
were not whole-h~ and certainly failed to convince 
the hard-line market monetarists. lndee<l the two theorists 
- Robert Bano and Hezschel Grossman - who developed 
the fnst fonnal general equilibrium model of a sticky wage 
and price economy were so horrified by their creation that 
they quickly abandoned it, Barro moving far to the right to 
help formulate 'New Classical' doctrine; Grossman shift-
ing to the less extreme territory of Implicit Contract theory. 
Within the neoclassical paradigm accepted by both sides, 
the monetarists did have theoretical consistency in their 
favour. But what about the facts of the real world, in 
particular, the ever more evident fact of unemployment? 
How could the monetarists rationalise what (to a layperson, 
anyway) seems like an obvious and chronic failure of 
supply and demand to match up? Well, rationalise it they 
~ applying a technique which in the hands of clever 
people like Milton Friedman and his 'Chicago School' 
colleagues has been a remarkably potent corrective to the 
policy activism of Keynesians and other would-be med-
dlers in the great self-ordering scheme of things. 
The technique has two steps to it First, when confronted 
with some apparently unattractive or even unsavoury 
practice, think up an ' efficiency defence', shewing why it 
really serves humanity's interests. Then, second, ram the 
point home by demonstrating that any well-meaning at-
tempt by government to interfere with the practice will 
actually make matters worse. 
Chicago economists have applied this technique with great 
ingenuity to monopolies, to resale price maintenance, to 
defending the trade in ivory. And they have applied it to 
justifying unemployment Here is the argument: since 
markets function well, anyone who wants to work will be 
able to. Therefore anyone in the labour force but not 
currently working must have chosen not to. Why would 
they do this? They must be engaged in full-time and 
productive 'search activity'. In a world of costly infonna-
tion it takes real resources, including time, to seek out the 
various job offers to find the one that best fits. Search 
unemployment is actuaJJy a rational and efficient invest-
ment in improving the allocation of resources. So there! 
And what about the government-only-makes-things-worse 
argument? Chicago-style economists actually know this to 
be true in any circumstance, as a corollary of their funda-
mental theorem that unimpeded market forces deliver the 
best of possible worlds, but the monetarist variant of the 
argument is worth spelling out Suppose the Minister of 
Finance forces, at gunpoint, the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank to expand the money supply. This will have an 
immediate effect on wages and prices. Currently unem-
ployed job searchers will tend to receive higher wage 
offers, and accept these, thus reducing search time and so 
the rate of unemployment below its 'natural' rate. But 
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when they go out and spend their higher wages, they will 
find that prices have also risen, so that the real wage on 
which their labour supply decision is based has not really 
changed. When word gets around about this, wage and 
price expectations will be adjusted upwards, and search 
activity and thus unemployment will drift back to their 
previous level. 
That is, government's well-meaning intervention will have 
resulted in no pennanent gain in employment, but inflation 
will have permanently ratcheted upwards (to be brought 
down again only by a painful bout of disinflation, involv-
ing unemployment temporarily higher than its natural 
rate). 
This is the economic model (technically tenned the 'Ex-
pectations augmented Phillips Curve') that the current 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Dr Brash, 
is relying on when he makes his announcements to the 
effect that using cheap money to buy jobs depends on 
'fooling people. ' 3 
Dr Brash is not rash enough to spell the model out to his 
audiences, who no doubt would be as quick as Keynesian 
economists are to point out its extraordinary implausibilities. 
First, take the notion of job search being more efficiently 
undertaken full-time. Common experience and empirical 
evidence tell us that, for almost all people, it is more 
efficient to search for a new job from an existing one -you 
get paid while you do it; you have opportunities to get 
information from other employed workers; and your cur-
rent job status is a good signal to prospective employers 
that you are capable of putting in useful day 's work. 
Nor is the idea of being fooled about prices particularly 
plausible or empirically supported. The whole idea that, in 
a situation of substantial unemployment, it is the supply 
side of the labour market that determines employment is 
implausible, and countered by the evidence that most 
searching workers accept the flfSt job they are offered. And 
why has unemployment risen so much over the last twenty 
years? Has search efficiency deteriorated drastically? In 
the 1970s some monetarists attributed increasing unem-
ployment to rising unemployment benefits (which make it 
possible for people to search longer). but in the 1980s most 
countries cut back on benefits, yet unemployment contin-
ued its inexorable increase. 
Theories and the New Zealand Experience 
Neither standard Keynesian nor monetarist stories seem to 
fit what has happened in New Zealand Underpinning 
(Keynesians believed) the Phillips Cwve was the demand-
side notion that resources. including labour, had continu-
ally to be reallocated to different finns and industries. as 
the economy grew and changed, and that expanding indus-
tries could hire their labour either from the 'pool ' of 
unemployed at the going wage or by bidding them away 
from their current jobs, with wage increases. The smaller 
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the unemployment pool, the more would wage increases 
be needed, with the size of these (as employers increas-
ingly bid against each other) becoming very large at very 
low unemployment rates, according to the apparent non-
linear shape of the Phillips curve trade-off. 
Yet, in New Zea1and, where up until 1977 labour moved 
happily between jobs and firms and industries with almost 
literally zero time spent in the unemployment pool, infla-
tion was not at all out of the ordinary, compared with other 
slow-growing economies. 
And the clear fact that no-one chose to ' irtvest' in voluntaiy 
full-time search despite quite generous unemployment 
benefits was- and is! -a terrific counter example to the 
monetarist rationalisation of unemployment 
On balance, though, this country would have to be said to 
have given weight to a Keynesian view of the world, in the 
very important sense of demonstrating the possibility of 
full employment. 
I know that standard explanations of New ZeaJand' s once-
remarkable unemployment record rely on 'hidden unem-
ployment' - over-manning - made possible by protection 
from external and (it is claimed) internal competition. I do 
in fact believe that 'over -manning' is part of the true story, 
but the key point here is that it cannot explain the absence 
of a Phillips trade-ort4 within the Keynesian frameworlc; 
nor the absence of full-time search unemployment re-
quired for stability in the monetarist model 
Such considerations did not impress the radical right-
wingers who were gathering their forces for the 
Rogemomics coup. In 1981, Rod Deane (then with the 
Reserve Bank) noted the existence of ' a body of monetarist 
and new classical analysis which has barely been tapped in 
New Zealand'S, and soon this body of analysis was being 
fitted in with the other ingredients of the supply-side 
revolution. Roger Douglas's 1986 Budget contained the 
passage: 'full employment depends on the ability of prices 
to JeSP9nd quickly and the speed with which resources can 
shift, •6 and subsequent policy changes, notably the Em-
ployment Contracts Act of 1991, were aimed at effecting 
rapid responses of prices and resources. 
The result? Unemployment increased three-fold from 1986 
to 1991 and is stilL after a couple of years of unusually high 
growth. twice what it was before the revolution (and a 
hundred times larger than during all those 'rigid· and 
'protected' years when prices supposedly could not re-
spond quickly and resources not shift easily). It is all very 
strange. 
A Hypothesis 
So how do we unravel the two great puzzles of modem 
New Zealand economic history - the non-inflationary 
zero-unemployment epoch and the sharp deterioration that 
followed? There must be something wrong with both 
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Keynesian and monetarist models, since neither can fully 
explain what happened_ My hypothesis is that what is 
(mainly) wrong is something the models share, namely 
their conception of the labour 'market'. 
Recall that this is based on the notion of perfect competi-
tion, with its assumed separation between supply and 
demand. In the labour market, each supplier of labour 
services operates independently. not only of other suppli-
ers but also of the demanders or purchasers of labour. Each 
agent works out how much they want to offer or purchase 
at the going wage and bids accordingly. A mysterious 
super-calculating 'auctioneer' co1lates all the bids and 
adjusts the wage up or down to bring the aggregate of 
supply offers into balance with the aggregate of demand 
offers. 
Criticism of this model has focussed on the unrealism of 
the assumption of the perfect but costless arbitraging 
auctioneer. Thus we have the monetarist notion of search 
unemployment~ which, even if it is wrong about the rela-
tive efficacy of search on and off the job, at least brings in 
explicitly the important consideration that, in the real 
world, finding out about wages and prices and jobs uses up 
real resources. and may have to be done by the supplying 
and demanding parties themselves, in the absence of an 
auctioneer or arbitrager in the literal sense. 
I will return to these ' transaction costs' below. They are 
quite important in the context of the Employment Con-
tracts Act. But first I would like to draw attention to another 
implicit assumption of the model which is especially 
problematic in the labour context Each agent is assumed 
to believe that their actions will not affect any other agents 
in the market, and so does not consider the welfare of other 
agents when deciding what to do. Indeed, they may not 
even know who the other agents are. Now, this is quite 
reasonable for something like wheat. of which there are 
many small suppliers of a homogeneous product The 
miller either knows nor cares whence came the wheat for 
the flour, so long as it meets the grade. 
But it does not match what happens in the ' market' for 
labour. For a start, it is hard to maintain anonymity. The 
identities of the supplier and purchaser of labour services 
will in general be known to each other. 7 Nor will the result 
be a simple bilateral transaction, in most cases. Most 
people work with other people in organisations of various 
sorts, such organisations being - as Coase and others have 
noted - devices for escaping from markets, in that re-
sources are allocated within them by administrative fiat, 
rather than through prices intermediated by an auctioneer. 
Much useful activity is best accomplished in teams. 
Now a feature of teams is that the members develop 
feelings for each other. Man and other ' left' writers have 
of course made much of the antipathy of interests (though 
not necessarily of feeling) between employing and em-
ployed classes. and would perceive cooperation in the 
workplace as extending only as far as the joint interests of 
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master and man - that is. to the extent of exploiting 
economies of scale and division of labour that increase the 
size of the pie the shares of which are then to be bitterly 
fought ovez in the struggle between classes. 
It would be romantic to pretend that workez and capitalist 
have ever been members of one great happy family in New 
Zealand But I suggest that. in the first decades after the 
war. our society was such that there was a good deal of 
empathy in the wof.c:place- of goodwill between those 
paying and those receiving wages and salaries. We had the 
shared experiences of the war and the Great Depression. 
We had the shared institution of a state-run education 
system that. perhaps more than any othezin the w<rl<L gave 
a reasonably equal chance to rich and po<r, rural and urban 
children to make their way in the economy according to 
their ability. We did not have ostentious markers of class 
- differences in culture and language. If our distribution of 
taxed income was possibly not as egalitarian as we remem-
befS. we did not see the lurid displays of great wealth and 
extravagance to be observed in the deregulated era. 
Technically, empathy means that the utility or well-being 
of others enters positively into the individual's utility 
function. This is not a revolutionary concept for economic 
theory, which has always been prepared implicitly or 
explicitly to admit empathy into discussion of the econom-
ics of the family. but economists have not. to my knowl-
edge, investigated the implications of empathy in the 
workplace. 
These implications may be quite important. Consider the 
situation of an employer fa~ with a downturn in demand. 
From the point of view of profitability. the rational thing 
will be to reduce costs by firing some workers. But if the 
well-being of those workers is a consideration alongside 
profitability, then the employer may decide to maintain 
employment levels Wltil demand picks up again. In gen-
eraL an employer confronted with someone wanting a job 
would say: 'So you want to work, do you? Well, I suppose 
we'd better find something for you to do.' Then, at the 
other end of the cycle, when demand is high and labour in 
short supply, workers may forego the opportunity to press 
for large wage increases out of sympathy with their em-
ployers. 
Technically, empathetic behaviour means that demand 
and supply curves are not independent if more work is 
offere<L employers will tend to hire more.9 
The interesting thing about such 'nice' behaviour is that, 
although from a short-term individualistic perspective it 
seems 'irrational', from a long-run. system point of view 
it may not be. Reduced year-~year fluctuations in em-
ployment and inflation encourage investments in human 
and physical capital. And the macroeconomic implica-
tions are self-reinforcing: by not laying off workers in a 
downturn, each employer contributes to maintaining in-
comes and thus the demand for each others' output. nip-
ping in the bud the multiplier that otherwise magnifies an 
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initial disturbance to aggregate demand. 
The hypothesis is, then, that a degotee of mutual sympathy 
led employers and employees to exercise forbearance in 
their exploitation of short-term bargaining power, with the 
result that the macro-economy largely escaped from the 
Phillips Curve tradeoff. 
What about the second puzzle, the deterioration of unem-
ployment perfonnance from the 1970s? My hypothesis 
here is that changes in the economic environment have 
eroded mutuality: it has become more costly to indulge in 
empathetic behaviour, and our inclination to do so has 
lessened -we have become less nice to each other in the 
workplace. This has happened as a byproduct of the 
rnicroeconomic reforms that 'opened' and 'deregulated' 
the economy. In a protected economy, firms may have the 
reserves of profitability that enable them to hold 'stocks' 
of 'excess' labour. Such reserves become too costly to 
maintain in the face of an onslaught of cut-price import 
competition, or in the situation of being forced to export to 
survive, or in the case of a government department under-
going corporatisation with its attendant shift to 'commer-
cial' operating procedures. The change is analogous to the 
US automobile industry being forced to move from 'just in 
case' towards 'just in time' inventory management prac-
tices by the success of Japanese manufacturers in the North 
American market. Now the costs of maintaining the inven-
t<ries of spare workers are thrown onto the community at 
large. 
So, the move towards a more 'market' -oriented economy 
makes it more costly to indulge in Wlselfish behaviour. As 
well, it probably reduces the desire to do so - inculcation 
of a more 'businesslike' spirit in managers and workers 
erodes warm/fuzzy notions of caring for one another, 
which are even seen as actively subversive to the operation 
of an efficient market economy. 10 
Thus, the labour market becomes more like an impersonal 
'commodity' market. like the market for wheat or dead fish 
or cooking ranges. An<L as in the markets for wheat and 
ranges (if not dead fish), it may seem natmal that a buffer 
stock of Wlemployed resources be maintained to cope with 
unforeseen fluctuations in supply and demand. From this 
perspective, it may even seem that an unemployment rate 
for labour of seven or eight percent is quite reasonable. 
This argument should not be pushed too far. Labour is 
different from inanimate objects like wheat and ranges in 
that it does not deteriorate with use. On the contrary, labour 
deteriorates with disuse, implying that, even from a purely 
rationalist point of view, the optimal stocks of Wlemployed 
labour would be smaller than those for other commodities 
-the benefits of having labour standing by to be redeployed 
as needed must be set against the deterioration in human 
capital from idleness. I expect that the prime economic 
function of unemployment in a commodity market envi-
ronment is to mitigate workers' bargaining power, the 
better to contain inflation and twist the distribution of 
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income in favour of management and (possibly) share-
holders. 
Tbe Employment Contracts Act 
One of the two most momentous and radical pieces of 
policy ' refonn ' was the ECA (the other being the Reserve 
Bank Act). As Walsh points ou~ this replaced the multiple 
goals of earlier industrial relations legislation (including 
social equity and industrial stability) with the single goal 
of promoting 'an efficient labour market •, which it was to 
effect by sweeping away various rules and regulations 
(such as penal rates for weekend work) and by promoting 
direct bilateral bargaining between man and master. with-
out the intermediation of the hated trade unions (who do 
not appear, at least by name, in the legislation). 
Like most of the radical neo-liberallegislation, the ECA 
can be criticised on two grounds: that 'efficiency' is too 
limited an objective for policy (especially policy affecting 
peoples' wcrking conditions and remuneration), and that 
it may not even be effective in promoting efficiency 
because the underlying economic model is flawed. 
I argue that there is more than a hint of paradox here: The 
ECA is generally believed- by supporters and detractors -
to be a 'more-market' piece of legislation, but in fact it may 
be destructive of markets in the proper sense. 
A good 'thick' market is defined as a situation in which 
anyone can buy or sell without affecting the price. There 
are two preconditions for this: that there be many buyers 
and sellers, and that none of these be large relative to the 
whole market The old New Zealand labour market was 
something like this. Wages were given in general wage 
orders and in national craft awards, setting at least the 
minimum rate for each trade and occupation. 
The advantages of a thick labour market are as follows: (a) 
it economizes on transaction costs, since one set of nego-
tiations does duty for all; (b) since they can't do anything 
about the wage, employers' attentions are focused on 
improving productivity as the way to increase profits; (c) 
workers (and finns) in a weak bargaining position are not 
exploited. 
The disadvantage, supposedly, is that it results in ineffi-
ciencies due to 'rigidities •. W orlcers are not homogeneous 
like bushells of wheat, so that one wage may not fit the 
needs and capabilities of all members of an occupation. 
This, of course, is the ostensible reason for the ECA, which 
encourages bilateral agreements tailored to suit each cir-
cumstance. 
However, the determination of the price of labour is 
awkward. In an efficient marke~ the price of something 
should. over the long run, reflect the costs of producing it. 
Labom is not, in the crude sense, a 'produced input' , 
though the value added to a worker by time spent in 
training was always reflected in differentials for skills. 
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These across-the-board loadings are at risk from the ECA. 
But the major factor is that their wage income is what most 
workers rely to feed, clothe and house themselves and their 
families. In the old New Zealand. there was a widely 
accepted assumption that the level of the wage should be 
such that a reasonably reliable and diligent (though not 
necessarily highly skilled) worker would earn enough to 
maintain a family at a decent standard of living. I expect 
that most New Zealanders still support this notion, but the 
ECA has helped undermine the institutions that delivered 
equity in income distribution. 
Instead, we have the argument that individual productivity 
should be the sole determinant of pay differentials. A 
' good' carpenter should make more than a 'mediocre' 
carpenter. Along with the moral difficulties in pursuing 
this criterion to the exclusion of input-based measures of 
worth, there are real efficiency concerns that labour econo-
mists can raise. As noted above, most work takes place in 
'teams', which have the important characteristic that the 
output of each member of the team depends significantly 
on what other members do. Team production is interde-
pendent. This has two consequences: first, it is usually 
difficult or even impossible to isolate the contnbution to 
output of individual members of the team; second. produc-
tivity depends on members helping each other and sharing 
information. 
Both these considerations militate against paying workers 
for their ' individual ' contribution. Instead, the smart way 
to get output out of a team is to make individual remunera-
tion dependent on total team output 
Of course the ECA does not proscribe team-based remu-
neration systems, and may even have facilitated them, in 
particular circumstances. But it also has fostered situations 
(such as that of the Air New Zealand pilots) where some 
workers are covered by a collective agnxment negotiated 
by the traditional union, others are looked after by a scab 
union, and a third group have signed individual contracts 
offered by the employer. Such divisiveness is unlikely to 
be good for morale and efficiency. 
It is my opinion that the changes introduced with the ECA 
go well beyond those efficiency-enhaocing innovations to 
the flexibility of the job place that could have been (and 
were being) introduced graduaU y as part of a less draconian 
reform process. 
But perhaps I am being naive in discussing the matter in 
terms of the pros and cons for efficiency. Given the 
important role (ascribed by Walsh) of the Business 
Roundtable in lobbying for the ECA, it is plausible that it 
just represents an old-fashioned power-grab- a successful 
effort to shift the balance of bargaining power from work-
ers to employers by weakening the collectivist instirutions 
that looked after workers' interests. 
If so, then we should be aware of the macroeconomic 
consequences. Although the ECA didn't cause our mas-
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sive increase in unemploymen~ it may stand in the way of 
New Zealand retmning to genuine full employment, be-
cause, in a system in which wages are determined by 
bilateral bargaining, the threat of unemployment is needed 
topreventinflationarywageincreasesinperiodsofgrowth. 
H we didn't have om own Phillips curve trade-off before, 
we do now. 
Otber Causes and Cures for Unemployment 
I should perhaps touch on- with oo claims to completeness 
or conclusiveness- some of the other factors that have been 
suggested to contribute to declines in employment per-
fonnance. 
(a) Technological Change 
It is common to see labour-saving technologies blamed for 
unemployment. Economists, who are trained to see the 
system-wide implications, disagree. Labour-saving means 
higher real incomes (lower prices and/oc higher profits) 
which must be spent on new production which will require 
more labom. The net long-term effect on employment is 
about zero. 
For two hundred years or so, the economists have been 
right on this. Could something have changed recently? For 
example, if the profits from cost-savings are leaving the 
country rather than recycling to create more jobs inside 
New Zealand? Perhaps, but it is not obvious. 
(b) Skills and Training 
When employers start complaining that they can' t get 
workers with the training they need, it is tempting to see 
skill shortages as the employment bottleneck. Tempting, 
but dangerous. Some mis-match between demand and 
supply is a normal and inevitable part of the market 
process. It is these mis-matches that provide the signals to 
workers and employers where to direct their investments 
in human capital. Just as with physical capital (plant and 
buildings), government can intervene with a very heavy 
hand here. Tplining has a long lead time. How do we know 
what skiJJs will be at a premium in five years or so? We 
don' t even know what the overall trends are: to a de-skiJJed 
labour force of 'hamburger flippers ', or to a highly edu-
cated cohort of computer-whizzes? 
(c) Job Sharing 
Despairing of ever finding employment for everyone, 
some propose that 'existing' jobs be shared. Economists 
call this the ' lump of work fallacy' - the notion that there 
is only just so much work that needs to be done. Certainly, 
it would be good to have the flexibility that pennits people 
who do not wish to work a standard 37.5 hour week to be 
able to meet their needs. But the real problem is a shortage 
of well paid full-time jobs, and this problem can only be 
reshuffled, not solved, by forced job sharing. 
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(d) Poverty Traps 
The poor in this country face implicit marginal tax rates 
that would horrify the well-to-do classes. An interesting 
case can be made for the abolition of all means-tested 
benefits, including the unemployment benefit, as a spur to 
eliminating poverty and encouraging job creation from the 
supply side. 
(e) External Policy Settings 
The conventional wisdom is that New Zealand' s future 
prosperity depends on being whole-heartedly integrated 
with the world economy. Certainly, no developed economy 
has moved so far so quickly from protectionism to liberal-
ism as we have. But have we overdone it? It can be argued 
that in a trading world dominated by huge transnational 
firms external and internal economies are essentially 
decoupled, in the sense that there is no reason why the 
forces determining international trade and investment flows 
should bring about domestic supply/demand balance (full 
employment). Only with a more inward-oriented policy 
stance can we hope to ' close the loops' between supply and 
demand that could restore full employment. 
Testing the Hypothesis 
A disturbing feature of the economic policy debate in New 
Zealand - apart from its lopsideness in favour of the 
reformers- is its lack of empirical foundations. Arguments 
are made and policy fonnulated on the basis of fairly 
simple a priori reasoning leavened sometimes with selec-
tive citing of overseas research. The present paper cannot 
be excepted from these strictures, because my own re-
search program is not yet far enough advanced to consti-
tute a full-fledged empirical test However. I can report on 
the design of the research and on results thus far. 
I am using annual data, from 1960 to 1992, for nineteen 
industries (including eight manufacturing industries). These 
data are, for the most part, from the database assembled for 
Professoc Brian Philpott's Research Project on Economic 
Planning, and kindly made available by him. 
The idea is to estimate 'employment functions ', which 
econometrically explain year to year changes in levels of 
employment in each industry as dependent on appropriate 
variables. Standard specifications of employment func-
tions have in common that employment is believed to be 
basically demand determined, but can differ as to how 
demand is modelled. Early fonnulations emphasized real 
output as determining the desired level of employment, on 
a simple Keynesian hypothesis. More recently, neoclassi-
cal price (real wage) variables have found their way into 
the specifications. The change seems to reflect not just 
intellectual fashions, but a genuine shift in the economic 
structures of OECD economies - employment-wage 
elasticities do seemed to have been increasing in size and 
significance, presumably as economies have been 
deregulated to confonn more closely to the neo-liberal 
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ideal type. 
The current ( 1991) version of the Reserve Bank model has 
both output and the real wage as detenninants of hours 
worked - an eclectic but not quite satisfying mix.11 The 
Reserve Bank model follows standard practice in allowing 
for lags in the adjustment of actual employment to the 
'desired' level, which could be due both to supply-side 
difficulties in hiring and firing workers, and to demand-
side caution about responding precipitously to what may 
be temporary changes in output 
My work to date has resulted in estimates, for each of the 
nineteen industries, of standard employment function 
models. Only for the manufacturing industries does the 
standard model 'worlc', with output and lagged employ-
ment (denoting partial adjustment to desired levels) as 
significant variables. The role of price variables is yet to be 
settled. In both the primary and tertiary sectors of the 
economy neither output nor price variables are significant, 
leaving employment to be 'explained' by its lagged (pre-
vious year) value and by a simple time trend. 
The data do, in most industries, show signs of a structural 
break in the employment time series, with this always 
being negative, in the sense of less labour being needed in 
later years than, ceteris paribus, would be expected from 
earlier experience. Many, but not all, of these structural 
breaks occur after 1986; some appear to date from the late 
1970s or early 1980s. The time series of industry output 
show, in almost all industries, a clear break in the mid-
1970s; growth being lower after about 1975. 
Future research 
The results thus far fall well short of resolving the New 
Zealand puzzles or testing the empathy hypothesis. I see 
two paths for future research to follow. First, the econo-
metric modelling needs further developmen~ focussing on 
searching for chagnes in the structure of the processes 
determining employment and output at the industry level. 
We can hypothesize that the speed of adjustment of actual 
to desired levels of employment will have quickened as 
employers are forced by a more 'competitive' market 
environment to maintian input levels close to short run 
cost-minimising levels, rather than hold reserves of labour 
through periods of reduced demand in the (partially self-
fulfilling) expectation that labout shortages will soon 
resmface. 
Changes in adjustment speeds can be quite easily tested for 
within the standard employment function framework. More 
difficult will be taking the analysis a step back from the 
adjustment of actual to desired employment to the expla-
nation of the determinants of desired employment itself. I 
noted above the evidence of increasingly important 'price' 
(real wage) effects - these need to be carefully scrutinised 
at the industry level, as do other components of the demand 
for labour. As for identifying the presence (or absence) in 
the data of direct interdependencies between supply and 
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demand due, for example, to empathy, I propose to test for 
this by including in the model factors extraneous to the 
short run profitability of the employer. What difference, 
for example, should overall labour market conditions 
make to the adjustment of employment in a particular 
industry facing a short term downturn in demand? H 
empathy is a positive factor, then the industry would lay off 
fewer workers the weaker the overall labour market situ-
ation, since it will be concerned with the likelihood of its 
workers finding alternative employment. In contrast, a 
narrowly profit-maximising perspective could result in 
larger layoffs in a weak aggregate labout market, because 
employers will be less worried about finding replacement 
workers when demand eventually turns up again. 
The second research path involves following up the 
macroeconomic implications of changes in microeconomic 
adjustment behaviour, given that one firms' employment 
decision will affect the demand of other firms' output, 
through the spending of wages and salaries. This will be 
explored at first by means of a fairly simple two sector 
dynamic general equilibrium model. 
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Notes 
1 This is to exaggerate the cyclical nature of economic 
fashions. In fact there has been a great deal of cumulative 
progress made in the techniques of macroeconomic man-
agement. revealed most strikingly after the stock market 
crash in October 1987, when nothing much happened - in 
contrast to the calamities that followed the 1929 Crash. 
The 'monetarist' central bankers and their Finance Minis-
ters had learnt enough Keynesian doctrine about the inter-
dependency of the world's economies to act quickly so that 
the 'real' economy would not be affected by the temporary 
collapse of paper asset values. 
2 It is an interesting possibility that the New Zealand 
economy has been so shorn of its Keynesian and other 
centralist institutions that the current ' inflationary' pres-
sure might best be seen as an appropriate reflation of prices 
depressed by the years of severe recession. 
3 See his spe«h to the Wellington Chamber of Commerce 
(Brash, 1994). 
4 Early New Zealand researchers did disrover a relation-
ship between wage changes and labour market conditions 
measured by the vacancy rate - markets forces were 
functioning! -but the point is the lack of a pool of available 
unemployed. See Brownlie and Hampton ( 1967) and Hall 
(1972). 
5 Quoted in A.M. Endres (1989, p133). 
6 ibid. p141: 
7 A counterexample would be people who supply their 
labour electronically, such as the Indians who write com-
puter software on contract to Western companies, who 
receive the output 'down the wire'. But this sort of arrange-
ment remains rare. 
8 Gould reports (pp 32-6) international comparisons of 
income distribution for around 1970 which do not show 
New Zealand to have been unusually egalitarian. He notes 
that these findings 'meet with some disbelief amongst 
well-informed New Zealanders'. that inequality may have 
increased at about this time, and that another study does 
find New Zealand incomes to be relatively equally distrib-
uted. 
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9 This direct interdependence is to be distinguished from 
the mhodox Keyoesian indirect or general equilibrium 
interdependence analysed, for example, by Barro and 
Grossman, whereby the aggregate of all households • spend-
ing on goods and services determines the aggregate of all 
the films' spending on households' wages and dividends. 
10 Cf Milton Friedman' s famous dictum that the only 
social responsibility of management is to make as much 
money as possible for the shareholders. 
11 In a multivariate regression, the intetpretation of a 
variable's coefficient is that it predicts the effect of a 
change in that variable on the dependent variable, holding 
all other variables constant But it is difficult to see how a 
change in the real wage could affect employment, holding 
output constant A lower wage could encourage substitu-
tion of labour for other inputs, but then the wage should be 
measured relative to the price of the other inputs, not (as in 
the Reserve Bank model) relative to the price of output. 
The t -statistic on the real wage variable is also suspiciously 
huge (at 49.5), which might imply some spuriousness, 
possibly resulting from constraining the output coefficient 
to be one. 
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